Vital lessons to be learned from history of the Concorde

Apr 15 2003 By Bill Midgley, The Journal

Tucked away in last week's news was the rather saddening report that Concorde is to be withdrawn from service this autumn.

What was seen as the flagship of the British aerospace industry will cease to fly very soon, or presumably will only fly on ceremonial or highly selected occasions. The French are also withdrawing their fleet, but for some reason one month later than British Airways.

And bearing in mind that this was always supposed to be a joint venture, this timing may strike some as being a little surprising.

Franco phobia apart, however, what we are seeing is the demise of yet another piece of superb British/French engineering, which originated at a time when Europe could still match, if not lead, the world in the development of technology.

There can be little doubt Concorde was intended to be a major leap forward in international air travel, covering the Atlantic in something like three- and-a half-hours and making the world a smaller place.

The history of the aeroplane, however, has been somewhat chequered. Putting aside the tragic crash in France, there have always been problems with the economics of Concorde. This plane is small, with a payload of around 100 people, the consequence of which prices have to be high, and have meant exclusive passenger lists, of business leaders, sports stars, and major names from the world of entertainment.

The rather more pedestrian methods of flight, such as Jumbo jets - if travelling at 600 miles an hour can be described as pedestrian - have retained their advantage, and perhaps more importantly have improved the comforts available to premium rate fare payers.

So the history of Concorde will be seen as yet another piece of magnificent technology that never really found its market. It may be that the market wasn't there and that the price was always too high, or that the market was too small to create a sufficient turnover to see a pay-back of the vast amount of investment that was involved.

In that there is a lesson, certainly for UK industries, where on so many occasions technology has been ahead of market demand and much effort has to be put into creating the demand for which people are not prepared to meet the price.

The history of British industry over the past 40 years is littered with such examples, from extreme areas as the C5 to the Zike, to some of the rather lower key, but still inventive areas of the new electronics industry and the modern technologies built around computer software.

Surely the lesson is that any form of development needs to establish whether there is a market for what is to be delivered. Market research is essential. Market place education is even more important to ensure a demand is created for a product, and while manufacturing may feel that the product alone will sell itself, the world outside tells us that is far from the case.

Perhaps there is something to be learned from the motor industries which are going through a period of introduction of new models. They are raising interest to a tremendous extent with teasers, with new launches and by making the product exclusive - not in price, but in the fact that many new models are now taking three to six months to deliver. That creates exclusivity, and consumers in particular like to feel that they are acquiring something ahead of the rest of the population.

That may have been a little difficult with Concorde.

I, like the majority of us, never had the opportunity to fly Concorde, but I felt a great pride in seeing it pass over the North-East on the few occasions when it visited us. It might just leave behind an inspiration rather than an epitaph.